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This article argues that commonality of regime type is 
not a sufficient condition for peaceful power transition. 
Other elements that have deserved very little attention 
can be much more determinant of the outcome, especially 
if we cross levels o analysis. This article advances a 
model that is going to apply to the cases of the United 
States (as a declining power) and India (as a rising 
power). The model and the empirical analysis uncover 
those factors, articulate them and explain why New 
Delhi contests important aspects of the American-led 
liberal order.
Resumo
Quando Duas Democracias Colidem: Índia e 
Estados Unidos, Visões Competitivas da Ordem 
Internacional?
Este artigo argumenta que a similaridade do tipo 
de regime não é o único fator que influência a con-
fluência dos estados em contexto de transição de 
poder. Pelo contrário, existe um número de ele-
mentos pouco estudados até hoje que podem ter 
uma grande influência em divergências entre esta-
dos democráticos, especialmente se as avaliarmos 
sob o ponto de vista de diversos níveis de análise 
(normalmente avaliados separadamente). Para 
isso, o artigo desenvolve um modelo de análise que 
vai aplicar aos casos dos Estados Unidos e da Índia, 
explicando, assim, porque é que Nova Deli tem 
vindo a contestar aspetos fundamentais da ordem 
internacional norte-americana.
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Introduction
In his famous book “Diplomacy”, Henry Kissinger affirmed that there was no known 
country who would not achieve a higher degree of power without trying to influence 
the course of events in international affairs (Kissinger, 1994: 37). However, as neoclas-
sical realists have proved since the 1990’s (in this topic Fareed Zakaria is particularly 
relevant) the real question is not about if a state is going to try to imprint their unique 
mark in the system, but when, how, and in the name of what (Zakaria, 1998: 37). 
We know, from classical realism and neoclassical realism that the international sys-
tem is a permissive condition, i.e., the system “gives states considerable latitude in 
defending their security interests, and the distribution of power merely set param-
eters for grand strategy” (Taliaferro, Lobell and Ripsman, 2009: 7). In other words, 
the international system provides constraints and opportunities for states to act in 
behalf of their national interest (Morgenthau, 1961: 8) which is, in part, defined not 
only by threat assessment but by states’ own collective ideas (Legro, 2005: 13). 
Therefore, the international system does not determine the quality or kind of policy 
choices each state is going to make. If we want to have a realistic framework that 
defines foreign policy making choices we should blend four elements: the structure 
of the international system, threat assessment (which state is my an enemy and to 
what degree), collective ideas (how each state self-image is going to influence the 
way it is exercise power), and endogenous and exogenous shocks (negative and 
positive) that lead the elites to reconsider their foreign policy and worldview posi-
tions towards the international order (Owen, 2010: 4).
India is an exemplary state in this matter: its most important rivalries, Pakistan and 
China were defined in the 1950’s and the 1960’s respectively. However, recent 
changes in policy – namely towards the United States and international order – 
were not determined by these enmities, but by shocks. There have been three since 
the 1990’s: the collapse of the Soviet Union and the almost simultaneous crises of 
the balance of payments at the beginning of the 1990’s (Ganguly and Mukherji, 
2011: 23, 84) that led to a lost decade in India’s foreign policy. Too centered on 
solving its economic problems (and in economic reforms determined by the IMF 
loans) New Delhi was consumed by domestic affairs.1
1 However two things must be noted: the first is that the way towards a more open economy was 
already underway before the shocks mentioned above. Rajiv Gandhi, the tragically assassina-
ted Prime Minister was, according to several authors, the major architect of the elites’ pact 
between the Congress Party and the businessmen towards a wider openness to the markets, 
back in the mid 1980’s (see for example Ganguly and Mukherji, 2011: 84; Kholi, 2012: 11). The 
other thing is that Gandhi’s measures were accelerated and broaden by the loans (and attached 
guarantees) granted to India by the IMF. However, it is also true that the economic reform in 
India were also not as ambitious as it is usually believed, and the state is still very present in 
much of the states’ economic affairs (Kholi, 2012: 17)
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The apathy was broken by the victory of the BJP2 and the first nuclear test per-
formed in 1998. Two consequences arose. The international community condemned 
India’s initiative, imposing sanctions and criticizing New Delhi openly, but it also 
triggered a new sort of attention over India: after all, the state was a democracy in 
a neighborhood of autocratic regimes, was one of the most populous countries in 
the world, was opening its economy to foreign markets, and now possessed nuclear 
power. These events prompt a last minute visit by Bill Clinton in March 2000 that 
created mixed feelings among the India elites. Some welcomed the President and 
perceived it as the American recognition that India was an important player, others 
saw it with mistrust: after all Clinton always emphasized the integration of China 
over India and the President’s visit came a little too late in his tenure. The BJP con-
sidered by most analysis more pragmatic and national interest oriented was in 
power, and according to some authors, determined to open a new era in Indian 
foreign policy (Mohan, 2015: 116; Muni, 2009: 20).3
However, the third shock was positive, albeit also very demanding. By the mid-
2000’s India stop been perceived internationally as a “supplicant” state and started 
to be seen as a “competitor” (Smith, 2007: 6). That came with a price: New Delhi’s 
elites had to start looking for the type of international actor they wanted their coun-
try to be, and how, as a responsible stakeholder, it would give its contribution to the 
world order. By this time the United Progressive Alliance (UPA1) coalition, led by 
the Congress Party, was back in the government. 
This emergence has implications especially given the context within which it started 
to happen. On the one hand, India’s rise has been shadowed by the rise of one of its 
major rivals, China (which has grown so far politically and economically faster 
than India), along with the rising prominence of other states like Russia and Brazil 
with very different political strategies, along with the United States strategic 
restraint (Sestanovich, 2014: 9). This scenario prompted what Robert Gilpin calls 
“the first phase of power transition”. This first phase is characterized by a period 
where states already perceive that the distribution of power is shifting but it did not 
change enough yet to propel confrontation (either form the status quo powers who 
will tend to challenge the most prominent rival to keep it from rising or the most 
prominent rising power trying to challenge the status quo power) (Gilpin, 1981: 14). 
But, more importantly, and still following Gilpin, the first phase is also the moment 
when states, both declining and rising, start to define their allegiances and possible 
2 As we will see later the BJP is a more ambitious party in terms of foreign policy and India’s 
insertion in market economy.
3 We do not refer to the nuclearization of India as a shock (at least for New Delhi). It was an 
internal decision that was the consequence of a long debate that started during Indira Gandhi’s 
tenure.
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future partnerships and alliances, as well as their positions about important mat-
ters in the international system. To put it simply, in the first phase of power transi-
tion states start or intensify their domestic debates about the international strategy 
they want to follow and what sort of role they want to play in world affairs. This is 
the phase India is currently facing. Internal debates are about what role India 
should play in the international system, now that it is recognized by its peers as an 
emerging power. 
So far, and according to a number of field interviews, as well as publications 
released in the last few years, New Delhi is inclined to follow its traditional “auton-
omy” strategy (Ollapally and Rajagopalan, 2012: 79), both for strategic reasons, to 
diversify friendships without antagonizing its possible neighboring rivals (Mohan 
2015: 201), and for value based reasons, materialized in the resurgence of what 
could be called Neo-Nehruvianism narrative, i.e., India’s positions are based on 
some of the fundamental values and strategic culture inspired in India’s founding 
father and adapted to the needs of the twenty first century (Soller, 2014: 19). 
Therefore, on the one hand, we are witnessing a more pragmatic power driven 
foreign policy since the end of the 1990’s, accompanied by a defensive moral based 
narrative that became more evident in the 2000’s. The former justifies what Mohan 
calls Modi’s “embrace to America” (Mohan, 2015: 113), and the later prescribes cau-
tion in world affairs, especially in what regards the values of the international order 
built mainly by the United States – that, in an overall perspective, India does not 
subscribe (Hurrell, 2006). This is an instance, perhaps the most important one, of 
how often New Delhi separates the multilateral order policies from the bilateral 
relations approaches (Chaudhuri, 2014: 27). 
Therefore, in what concerns multilateral relations, India has been acting politically 
–often siding with China – against the liberal international order and the unipolar 
world dominated by the United States that New Delhi seems to perceive as danger-
ous and against its interests (Acharya, 2014: 4). New Delhi is not necessarily acting 
against the United States bilaterally (remember Modi’s embrace) with whom it 
jointly works in particular policies where there is mutual understanding and/or 
interest such as combating terrorism, joint policies on nuclear proliferation, and 
more recently, in a number of joint military exercises (see MOD 2012 Report). How-
ever, since power is not only absolute but also relative and international relations 
are not only multilateral but also bilateral, while undermining Washington’s led-
liberal order, India is also helping empowering its rival, China, endangering its 
own security. This behavior is puzzling both strategically (why would New Delhi 
empower Beijing?) and in what concerns the international order (why would India 
endanger a liberal order that tends to defend and enhance its regime type?).
Taking this short introduction into account, this paper asks the following question: 
why is India taking security risks to weaken the American liberal order? 
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The answer might be in two connected elements identified recently by the Oxford 
Handbook of India Foreign Policy. First, there is very little or almost no theorization on 
the role of India in international relations (Malone, Mohan and Raghavan, 2015: 8). 
There are plenty of books and articles about India’s foreign policy, but very little 
has been written on India’s worldview and how it relates to the ongoing liberal 
order. The second reason rests in a more empirical fact: despite being a democracy 
since its independence, India has little taste for some of the norms and rules 
advanced and enhanced by a Western-value based international order. 
The most common example is New Delhi’s rejection of the idea of spreading 
democracy (Muni, 2009: 4, 18). As it was recently written by a number of influential 
authors among the Indian elites “we are committed to democratic practices and are 
convinced that robust democracies are a surer guarantee of reciprocity in our neigh-
borhood and beyond. Yet we do not promote democracy or see it as an ideological 
concept that serves as a polarizing axes in world politics” (Khilnani et al., 2014: 77) 
(emphasis added). Human rights protection by force and the denial of international 
legitimacy to states that are not democracies are just two of the ordering principles 
where India is in disagreement with the United States. As we shall see later, other 
overarching issues are at stake. 
Taking this gap into account (lack of scientific production on India’s role in the 
world) and the idea that India wants to take advantage of its image as a “non-
aggressive power” (Khilnani et al., 2014: 12) this paper advances the hypothesis that 
New Delhi is a more “introverted” democracy if compared with the more “extro-
verted” character of Washington’s foreign policy and international order4, which 
precludes a closer relationship among the two states. As such, this paper makes two 
arguments: the first is that there is a history of tense relations between Washington 
and New Delhi that is a strong constraint to a deeper understanding between the 
two states. It is not necessarily (or at least not only) a matter of resentment, or of 
what Bruce Jones calls an “impulse of rivalry” (Jones, 2014: 4); it is a matter of reci-
procity, a fundamental value in the Indian strategic culture.
4 The terms “introverted” and “extroverted” used here to classify the different character of 
India and the United States democracy have been adapted from the terminology recently 
introduced by Madalena Meyer Resende to qualify types of nationalism. “Introverted natio-
nalism” refers to sorts of that are skeptical about supra-national institutions and their benefi-
cial effects on state-building institutions while “extroverted nationalism” refers to those who 
believe that supra-national institutions are beneficial and positively transformative (see 
Resende, 2015: 7, 10, 86). Adapted to democracy, these terms should read as the difference 
between a more contained democracy that excludes a number of interventionist policies from 
its strategy thinking (introverted) and a democracy that has a more expansionist and interven-
tionist policy in the name of democracy (extroverted). Along the paper, these differences will 
become clearer.
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Even Ashley Tellis, one of the major defenders of a rapprochement between India 
and America affirms that “any effort to assess the future of U.S.-Indian relations 
must begin with an attempt to understand weather the fundamental constraints 
that pervaded the development of close bilateral ties in the past have disappeared 
irrevocably” (Tellis, 2015: 488). This is telling about an ongoing mistrust that has 
been fading but is yet to be completely overcome (Ollapally and Rajagopalan, 2012: 
83)5. Conversely, Indian elites tend to see the liberal international order as harmful 
to their interests and values as well as for other states that, for one reason or another, 
have been so far completely or partially excluded from it. If the order was built by 
the United States and its allies – and India, despite being a democracy did not 
belong to it – there is a possibility that New Delhi will tend to see the order through 
the lenses of this non-declared but existent estrangement.
The second argument is that there are different worldviews in Washington and 
New Delhi, and both are rooted in the history and identity of those countries. 
Therefore we should expect some problems to arise in India’s relationship with the 
international order. The abundant literature about the relationship between New 
Delhi and the U.S scarcely covers that fact and the reasons why this problem goes 
beyond the bilateral relationship and relates to the comprehensive way India sees 
the liberal international order through the lenses of its own identity. To prove this 
argument it is necessary to fill, at least partly, the theory gap Malone, Mohan, and 
Raghavan mentioned, and to focus in trying to understand the relationship of India 
with the world and, more specifically, with the norms and rules that are accepted 
by the international community.
These arguments are going to be displayed in four sections. The first is a brief clari-
fication of a number of concepts, indispensable to understand both the interna-
tional order in its different dimensions, as well as India’s role in the international 
system, especially in the upcoming power transition. The second section presents a 
model of analysis that will theoretically sum up the components of the problem 
addressed by this article. As we will see, part of the model regards the relationship 
between the hegemonic power and other states and the way other states perceive 
and relate to the international order. The model asks for an empirical analysis that 
will be the subject of the last two sections, one (the third part of the article) regard-
5 According to interviews conducted by the author in New Delhi in 2014, there is still a large 
mistrust among the public opinion over the United States, especially during Democrat admi-
nistrations. There is a general belief that the integrationist positions of the Democrats lead them 
to pay more attention to China than to India. The same can be said about the elites. Although 
there is a younger generation who is more open to the United States, elite interviews showed 
that the Cold War grievances are still very much present among several academics and policy 
makers.
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ing the American liberal international order and what the United States expects of 
its international liberal allies, and the other (the forth section of this article) will 
approach India’s “response”. This last section looks at India’s historical relation-
ship with the United States, its worldview, and consequent evaluation of American 
international standards. 
The paper concludes that the two elements – the bilateral relationship and the per-
ception of the international order – are both causes of India’s commitment to con-
tribute to the enhancement of a multipolar international system. However, it will 
also highlight the security dilemma that India has so far ignored but sooner or later 
will have face: the fact that its political actions have the collateral effect of empow-
ering China, the most important threat to India’s security.
Conceptualizing International Order and Emerging States in Phase One of Power 
Transition
The international order is usually conceptualized as the set of norms and rules that 
regulate the relations among states at a giving moment in time. Usually the interna-
tional organizations of the new international order are built right after deep crisis 
or wars. The winners negotiate mechanisms that simultaneously perpetuate their 
power and interest, including the creation of conditions for lasting peace (Iken-
berry, 2011: 36). Most authors point out that the attempts to creating such arrange-
ments were the Peace of Westphalia (1648), followed by the Congress of Vienna that 
generated the Concert of Europe (1815), the very short-lived Treaty of Versailles 
(signed in 1919), the institutionalized order after World War II (1942-1989), and the 
post-Cold War American global hegemonic order (1991-ongoing) (see Clark, 2011 
and Kissinger, 2014).
In all cases but the last, the states that negotiated the order had win a war, which 
gave them legitimacy to start a new institutional arrangement, but also made them 
sit around the table and negotiate, make concessions, adapt to one another, and 
accommodate. The last case was different: there was a sole superpower that after 
some indecision opted for a Wilsonian order that it believed was good not only to 
extend its primacy across time, but also to the humanity in general, once liberalism, 
the ideology of progress represented by the United States no longer had rivals (Smith 
1994: 151) and have proved to be the most conductive to prosperity and happiness. 
We will get back to this issue on section three. Now, suffice to say that despite the 
legitimacy borrowed by winning the bipolar conflict, the fact that there was no nego-
tiation opened a new era for the definitions and contours of international order.
Furthermore, the upcoming power transition comes with three novelties. First, 
there is reason to believe that the United States will not lose its position as a great 
power (Buzan, 2004: 87). Despite the spectacular economic rise of states like China 
and India and the fact that Russia’s assertiveness has grown recently without much 
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resistance from other states, Washington is still the most powerful state in a number 
of aspects, especially in what concerns military power (Nye, 2015: 8). 
Second, what is likely to happen is the rise of a few poles of power, none of them a 
clear winner or loser, with very different visions of what a fair and peaceful order 
means and with fundamental differences of collective identities. On one hand, 
“hegemonic war” (Aron, 1966: 70) is much less likely as most of the states possess 
nuclear weapons, tending to natural deterrence (Waltz, 2009: 87-88); but on the 
other hand, due to the blurry hierarchy among the states and differences on their 
ends, order will also be more difficult to negotiate. When should negotiations start? 
What are the central issues to be discussed besides “hierarchy of prestige”?6 Which 
states will sit around the negotiations table? Which conceptions are they willing to 
make?
This leads us to the third point that will also deserve further discussion along the 
article: the ongoing liberal international order is highly institutionalized (Ikenberry, 
2011: 28). This can have one of two consequences: either accommodation, as the 
upcoming powers will accept the ongoing order with due accommodation and few 
changes; or a more difficult power transformation, if the newcomers do not accept 
the rules of the game and are willing to change them at a very high degree. Destroy-
ing and building new institutions is a herculean job. As theory tells us, institutions 
are hard to change gradually, let alone to transform (Owen, 2010: 57). Therefore, it 
is likely that a highly institutionalized international order will be harder to negoti-
ate. So far, rising states have actually been using the order’s institutions in two 
ways: to promote themselves (Brazil and India have been claiming for a seat in the 
United Nations Security Council) or to denounce the American-led order itself (as 
the Doha Round of the World Trade Organization or the last two Climate Summits 
in Copenhagen and Paris illustrate). 
These new characteristics require more sophisticated definitions of order. Besides 
distribution of power, institutions and the rules of the game, there are other five 
elements worth evaluating, as they are to be expected to generate more tension 
among the superpower and the rising powers of the international system.
The first is legitimacy, i.e., “the authority contract” between the hegemonic power 
and the states that are going to be ruled (Lake, 2009: 93). As we will see there are 
different sources of legitimacy according to the United States and the emergent 
powers. 
The second concept is justice, or, in other words, “the principles of right and justice 
[that] are selected and agreed upon” by the parts and that are going to constitute 
the core of the hierarchy of states. 
6 This is an expression borrowed from Gilpin (1981: 31).
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The third element is states’ “worldviews”. In the past, this factor was easier to over-
come; both in Westphalia and Vienna, international powerful actors would stick to 
a minimal base of principles that would allow them diversity and pluralism in 
a number of matters – especially internal (Kissinger, 2014: 12)7. The ideological 
problem would only come in World War II and the end result was the division of 
the world in two – a Western democratic sphere and a socialist centralized one. 
There was no further negotiation after the beginning of the bipolar conflict. The end 
of the Cold War removed ideational issues from the global debate again due to the 
collapse of one of the competitors. However, the problem of different worldviews 
is likely to return again due to the differences among the contestants. 
Forth is the sense of belonging. As theory tells us, when there is an international 
order, especially a hegemonic one, some states abide by consent and others are 
coerced into it (Keohane, 1984: 63; Buzan 2014: 18)8. States that feel they belong to 
the order tend to be more cooperative and less unsatisfied once they become great 
powers. 
Finally, the international order has a dimension an author calls “normative appro-
bation” (Clark, 2011: 104), which basically sums the previous elements. A state may 
strongly disagree with the principles of the order but it might not be able to change 
the rules of the game for a long time (being a colony the classical example). As such, 
the order, both during its formation period and its lifetime, has a dynamic nature. It 
incorporates every states relationship with the hegemonic power, as well as the 
judgment of the order’s norms and rules (that are also not static). But we only tend 
to remember this dynamics component – that is arguably the most important aspect 
of the international order – when power starts to shift. 
This more comprehensive definition of international order – that entails not only 
distribution of power, norms, rules and international institutions, but also legiti-
macy, justice, worldviews, belonging and approbation – is particularly important 
as we face the rise of what Sean Burges calls “emergent states”. An emerging state 
is one that “does not seem to realize that [it should] be happily (and quietly) joining 
the liberal ‘West’ club constructed by the United States. The emerging state does not 
seem to want to be used to set the current framework of global governance rules 
7 This was the case both of the peace of Westphalia, that had the goal of allowing each state to 
choose the religious tendency inside their border and Vienna, where states were allowed to 
have completely different regimes types. In both cases the ordering principle was balance of 
power. In Westphalia, equal sovereignty allowed these free internal choices. In Vienna, there 
was a difference between great powers and other states, but internal choices were also respec-
ted as long as they did not interfere in states relations.
8 Coercion does not necessarily mean military conflict: it means that some states are not comfor-
table with the rules of the game but they are not strong enough to change them.
Diana Soller
 37 Nação e Defesa
and institutions” (Burges, 2014: 286). However, it does not mean that it wants to 
tear it apart.
In previous power transitions, the literature used to categorize states in two groups. 
The status quo powers, the ones that wanted to maintain the ongoing order because 
they were satisfied with it (satisfaction might require accommodation, i.e., the recog-
nition of new great power status, but not the change of the rules of the game). The 
other category were the revisionist powers, the ones that seek to change the order, 
as it did not serve their interests and purposes (Hurrell, 2007: 3). Those states would 
not only be willing to change their position in the distribution of power, they would 
also want to redefine the social rules of the community of states (Gilpin, 1981: 11). 
Today, these classifications are more blurred. For example Randall Schweller sees a 
finer degree of dissatisfaction, arguing that emerging states can be “spoilers, sup-
porters or shirkers” (Schweller, 2011: 287), or, in an opposite way, Miles Kahler clas-
sifies all rising powers as “moderate reformers” (Kahler, 2013: 279). Others authors 
prefer to study the different roles each rising state would like to play in a changing 
world (see for example Burges, 2013; Narlikar, 2013). India, despite its repeated 
rhetoric on democracy has been displaying the will to correct injustices that, in its 
perspective, the American order brought to its region (but without exaggerated 
claims of U.S. lack of legitimacy). It believes in sovereignty as the central value of 
the international system and rejects intromission and intervention of the most pow-
erful states in the system (Bajpai, 2003: 258-259) It also contests liberalism as a nec-
essary condition for belonging to the international society (Hurrell, 2003: 2, 44), and 
believes, inequality is not only a result of bad internal policies, but of the Western 
exploitation of developing countries (Gallagher, 2013: 2) among other examples. 
In sum, all these authors and their sometimes confusing definitions lead us to 
another problem: states that are rising might very well be something in between – 
not revisionist, nor status quo. They desire to reform the order to fit in, not only in 
the power politics sense (to be recognized as great powers), but also with what they 
think is their unique form of contribution to the international order (that they 
believe they can improve by advancing their particular ideas) helping to create 
setting that is more fair, just, and encompassing of the desires of other states. India 
and Brazil fit that model (probably Russia and China are more revisionists): they 
see the international order as too rigid as only liberal democracies similar to 
America seen to fit in (Grey, 2000: 1).Therefore they are looking to disrupt it through 
soft balancing (see Paul, 2005) without completely destroying it. They are willing to 
introducing their own values that better reflect their interests and “foreign policy 
traditions” (Crandall, 2011: 10). 
They are also aware that they are “global swing states” (Fontaine and Kilman, 2013: 
93), meaning that the way they (will) choose to conduct their foreign policy (through 
“taking new responsibilities, free-riding or obstructing”) and develop their rela-
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tionships with other states is going to have impact in the current liberal interna-
tional order. Of course, power emphasizes dilemmas that were already underlying 
states’ internal debates. The difference is that currently these “emerging states” 
start to be pressured by the community of states to make decisions that they were 
able to postpone when their international status was less prominent. India is one of 
those states. 
Conceptualizing Decision Making Towards the International Order
Both realists and liberals would advise India to join the international liberal order. 
Among the community of liberal scholars is almost unanimous the claim that the 
United States would be willing to share power with their fellow democracies (Iken-
berry, 2011: 6), especially with India because of its economic and latent power (i.e. 
size and population), and its geographical position (proximity with China) that 
would make New Delhi the ideal ally to contain Beijing. Actually it is fair to 
acknowledge that George W. Bush’s initiative to bring India into the Non-Prolifer-
ation Treaty in 2005, as well as Condoleezza Rice’s official trip to India, declaring 
the United States willingness to support India’s rise are part of those efforts carried 
out by the Washington in the previous administration to reinforce the relation 
between the two states9 (Baru, 2014: 199; Tellis, 2015: 492). 
Furthermore, in theoretical terms, there is a strong belief among American scholars 
and policymakers that the Democratic Peace Thesis will have an important role in 
the states relations in the future. According to that theory, applied to power transi-
tion, there is almost unanimity in pointing out that regime type is a smoothing 
factor in power transition, and will direct democratic rising states towards an 
approximation of one another to preserve the values of the international liberal 
order10. This has been reinforced rhetorically by New Delhi when the BJP was in 
power (Mohan, 2015: 15). A lead followed by Manmohan Singh (despite strong 
criticism along the lines of the Congress Party).
However, in practice, India seems reticent to do so, and there are two important 
reasons to justify New Delhi’s choice, which are usually absent from the debate. 
First is what we call India’s “collective identity” (from which regime type is just one 
of the characteristics). Constructivism develops its main theoretical points over the 
9 Some authors claimed that the rapprochement started right at the end of Bill Clinton’s admi-
nistration, when the U.S. President made an official visit to the country in March 2000, while 
suspending the sanctions imposed after the Indian nuclear test. However, it was right at the 
end of his tenure, therefore it is fair to affirm that the President that really tried to build a solid 
relationship with India was George W. Bush.
10 For a detailed explanation of why the Democratic Peace Thesis might not work in the case of 
U.S.-India relations see Soller (2014: 12-17).
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assumption of states’ socialization. Following Alexander Wendt’s lead, most 
authors focus either on mutual co-constitution or on one of the vectors of the 
“structure-agency” interaction (i.e. how the structure influences the state or the 
state influences the structure) (Mercer, 1995: 230; Wendt, 1999: 26).
However, we believe that there is a privileged role for states’ self-image in the crea-
tion of their worldviews. Self-identity, “one’s conception of who one is and who 
one is not” (Anderson, 2010: 46), is usually disregarded, but it is critical in debates 
among elites specially during shocks, as they look for internal references (i.e. his-
torical experiences, learning processes, traditions, values, exceptionalism, the 
founding fathers’ views) to make decisions, including to debate a vision of how the 
international order should look like. 
Therefore, and this is the second reason, states strongly use first level of analysis’ 
elements (self-images emerging from internal debates and decisions) to evaluate, 
on the one hand, the behavior of the hegemonic state(s) (second level of analysis), 
and, on the other hand, the values that underlie the international order (third level 
of analysis) they have been subjected to. This evaluation (the dynamic part of the 
international order) is going to determine the degree of contestation (if any) of the 
international order. In sum, we can only evaluate satisfaction (and compliance with 
the order) or dissatisfaction (which entails some degree of revisionism) if we under-
stand how the three levels of analysis interact. To do so, we developed the follow-
ing model.
India through, its historical experiences, traditions and internal debates (Waltz, 
1967: 3) developed a set of collective ideas that by interaction with exogenous 
factors – chiefly the configuration of regional and international distribution of 
power – are expressed in its national interests. These experiences also lead to an 
















When Different Democracies Collide: India and United States, 
Competing Visions of the International Order?
Nação e Defesa 40
understanding of what an international order that is fair and protective of their 
interests should look like.
Simultaneously those collective ideas are fundamental to evaluate both the 
hegemonic states’ behavior and the international order that together constitute the 
way India is going to evaluate the international order as a whole. This detail is 
important inasmuch as one of the most common criticisms that come from New 
Delhi is the lack of reciprocity of the United States towards India and Washington’s 
use of double standards11 (depending on the political proximity of the state and/or 
their own fulfillment of the rules they themselves created). Consequently, there is 
an overall judgment of the international order de facto, (that includes a composite of 
the perception of the behavior of the hegemonic power and an evaluation of the 
values, and how they impact India’s interests) against the “imagined” order that 
India finds both more suitable to its interests and more just for the world (according 
to its internal values). The more approximate the de facto order and the “imagined” 
order are, the most likely is the probability of alignment in context of power transi-
tion. The opposite is also true. 
What follows is an empirical test of the proposed model. We start by looking at the 
American-led international order and the expectations developed by Washington 
concerning other democratic states. Then, we will proceed with an analysis of how 
India is responding to these expectations. 
America’s Extroverted Democracy
When it comes to classify the United States as an international power terms as 
democracy and liberalism come to mind. “Liberalism” is the set of “ideas [the 
United States] holds about how power should be used” (Legro, 2005: 3). Therefore, 
despite deviations related to securing vital interests, liberalism provides the idea-
tional framework, the set of “collective ideas” that guides American order building 
and foreign policy12.
In what concerns the third level of analysis, (and as a consequence of the first level), 
the United States created a liberal international order – sometimes referred as 
American-led international order – that reflects its internal values. Order is always 
a project with a purpose (Hurrell, 2007: 2) and in the present case, the American 
11 This was a very usual criticism heard during field interviews. Even more pro-American schol-
ars/policy makers in India, identified this as one of the most prominent problems concerning 
Washington behavior (along with forceful regime change due to imperialistic interests). 
12 Other authors use other terms such as “foreign policy tradition” or “political culture” to desig-
nate the same phenomenon (Crandall, 2011: 8; Ambrosius, 2012: 7). However, we consider the 
term “collective ideas” more accurate as it brings us back to the first level of analysis and its 
expansion to the other levels.
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order is based on the “idea of a liberal solidarist society of states” (Hurrell, 2007: 5) 
(emphasis added) that will in turn, through progress and time become, in its most 
ambitious view a “world order of democratic states” (Ambrosius, 2002: 7). 
Specifically, when Woodrow Wilson proposed a new world order, he was deliber-
ately rejecting the classical European model of balance of power, while organiza-
tion and advancing a new one inspired on American internal ideological principles 
(Cooper, 1983: 270). Since Wilson’s Fourteen Points, most elements of the United 
States corollary were maintained, some reinforced and some added, contributing to 
a certain definition of what it means to be a liberal international actor and how the 
liberal international order should be organized (Mandelbaum, 2002: 34). 
Woodrow Wilson’s view of the world can be summed in four main principles: 
national self-determination – that required sovereignty and democratic self-gov-
ernment; liberalization of the world economy; collective security; and progressive 
history. These four main principles, according to Wilson and most of his followers 
are universal, i.e., they fit the peoples of every nation of the world independently of 
their history, cultural, or religious heritage (Ambrosius, 2002: 2). 
The logic was the following: an international order based on balance of power had 
proved inefficient in preventing war; therefore the international system should be 
reorganized according to the United States constitutional principles that enabled its 
peaceful prosperity since the Civil War. Those principles were to be reflected in an 
international organization – the League of Nations – that would create a framework 
for peaceful exchange and favor states’ path towards self-determination and 
democracy (Soller, 2009: 23). That would lead to the growth of the number of 
democracies and consequently the occurrence of war would decline. Wilson was a 
firm believer in Kant’s vision that democracies do not go to war with one another 
and tend to get together in a federation for perpetual peace, due to a number of 
similarities that would lead them to defend the same values against putative ene-
mies (Ikenberry, 2008: 10; Mandelbaum, 2002: 67). 
These were the principles behind Wilson’s plan to “make the world safe for 
democracy” and the ideational foundations of what later came to know as Pax 
Americana (Lind, 2006: 25). The logic was the following: sovereignty (and self-deter-
mination) was dependent on self-government; self-government would lead to the 
natural choice of democracy as regime type, once history was moving towards uni-
versal liberalism; and the United States role was to provide the necessary structures 
to facilitate this march towards progress (Ikenberry, 2008: 15). 
It was implied that the League of Nations was to be based in American values due 
to its “unique nature, distinct from European great powers” (Legro, 2005: 61); that, 
guided by the U.S. leadership of collective security, it would became “a system 
in which all nations in the world, powerful and weak, automatically would unite 
to punish any aggression by any country anywhere” as the only way to restore 
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enduring peace in the international system after World War I (Lind, 2006: 97), while 
contributing to “end tyranny” when it was on the way of democratic development 
(Gaddis, 2008: 13). Implicit was the rejection of legitimacy of states that did not 
share the United States regime type. 
After World War II, the United States became the “Liberal Leviathan”, to use Iken-
berry’s (2011) famous and accurate expression. The decline of the European powers 
after the war brought the United States and the Soviet Union to the top of power 
politics and soon their rivalry began. This transition and posterior bipolar conflict 
had two major consequences.
First, the U.S. Western hegemony became highly institutionalized. Franklyn Delano 
Roosevelt had already developed universal political and economic institutions 
(the United Nations and its associated agencies, Bretton Woods), continuing Wilson 
legacy while giving it a pragmatic shift: FDR’s order was negotiated with his war 
allies (Great Britain and the Soviet Union) and China, to make sure that there was a 
possibility of introducing power politics (the UN Security Council) into an all-Ame- 
rican framework of market economy, human rights, and collective security. However, 
the beginning of the Cold War led President Henry Truman to make an addition 
to his predecessor’s agenda: it was necessary to build a separated peace among 
democracies (NATO and the permanent security alliance with Japan) and to reinforce 
the idea of democratic legitimacy (Ruggie, 1996: 38, 40) to face an ideological enemy. 
The second consequence was a change in the relationships with states outside the 
permanent alliances spectrum. Since the beginning the of Cold War, the rivals of 
democracy were no longer states yet to transition to democracy – as in Wilson’s 
time – but Communist states, or states that sympathized with Communism. As we 
will see in the next section, the Cold War opened a wound in the U.S.-Indian rela-
tions that is yet to be completely overcome (Kapur, 2010: 265). 
As goes without saying, the United States won the Cold War and the major con- 
sequence of the victory was the reinforcement of the liberal international order. 
Wilsonian principles were further institutionalized in international organizations 
(Paris, 2004: 3); market economy became the official tool for pushing for democra-
tization around the world; there was a reinforcement of long term commitments 
among democracies – materialized first and foremost in the enlargement of NATO 
to the former Warsaw Pact countries (Golgeier, 1999: 57); and the individual became 
the center of international law, allowing forceful interventions, robust arbitrations, 
and a considerable number of state-building operations planned under the twin 
values of democracy and market economy (Paris, 2004: 19). After the end of the 
Cold War, the United States were a fully “extroverted democracy”: the American 
hegemony was globalized and consolidated along with a radicalization of the 
liberal values, and the crystallization of democracy as the only legitimate regime 
type in the world (Collier, 2009: 3). 
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This was manifested in several ways: one was the development of the “End of His-
tory” narrative. Its argument was that the U.S. had defeated all forms of progres-
sive approaches to political affairs and it was a matter of time until democracy and 
market economy would spread around the globe (Fukuyama, 1992: xi). The liberal 
version of the theory of modernity (see Lipset, 1960) was rescued, and there was a 
consensus in Washington that the U.S. should pursue policies to stimulate market 
openness that would lead to the creation of a middle class ready to progressively 
demand more freedom (Bacevich, 2002: 101). As the “End of History” became the 
dominant doctrine, it introduced the possibility for the United States to act openly 
in the name of those values. Debates on “promoting democracy”, “aiding democ-
racy” and “supporting democracy” became widespread (Carothers, 1999; Cox, 
Ikenberry and Inoguchi, 2000). This narrative also consolidated the idea that Amer-
ica was the model that all democracies should follow (Oren, 1999: 267). 
As such, it is not surprising that liberal internationalists became a very preemi-
nent group among decision makers in Washington, introducing a number of 
changes in the international order. The most important was a normative revolu-
tion: state sovereignty was removed from its central place at the heart of interna-
tional law and replaced by the individual (Badescu, 2011: 20; Paris, 2004: 11). The 
“Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) rule was instituted by the United Nations in 
2005, creating a legal framework that allowed interference and even intervention 
on other states’ affairs in case of incapacity (or impossibility) of fulfillment of the 
social contract.
Convinced that these rules would be generally accepted by any democratic power, 
welcome to join the “opened” and “flexible” liberal order (Ikenberry, 2011: 20) – a 
bipartisan commission summed up the necessary attributes to be accepted in a 
hypothetical league of democracies (yet another incarnation of Wilson’s project) for 
the twenty first century:
“Membership would be predicated not on an abstract definition of liberal 
democracy or on the labels attached by states to other states, but rather by the 
obligations that members are willing to take on themselves. Members would 
have to: pledge not to use force or plan to use force against one another; com-
mit to holding multiparty, free-and-fair elections at regular intervals; guaran-
tee civil and political rights for their citizens enforceable by an independent 
judiciary; and accept that states have a “responsibility to protect” their citi-
zens from avoidable catastrophe and that the international community has a 
right to act if they fail to uphold it” (Ikenberry and Slaughter, 2006: 26). 
This excerpt sums up the ongoing rigidity of what is the expected behavior of a 
democracy in the international system according to the declining but still hegem-
onic power. Democratic international actors are expected to maintain and enhance 
their democratic internal practices while being an example to their neighbors; to 
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comply with the liberal international order; to open their economies to globaliza-
tion; to participate in collective security; to accept and participate in the R2P; and to 
agree with the idea that autocracies are less legitimate actors in the international 
system (Doyle, 2012: 25). 
Two things must be added before we turn to India’s reaction. First, the liberal inter-
national order had, so far, positive results. It kept the Western democracies cohe-
sive, allowing economic prosperity and a degree of stability (the provision of public 
goods that Hegemonic Stability Theory mentions widely)13, and was key to the 
Western victory in the Cold War. 
Second, Barack Obama’s administration was a lot less enthusiastic about this surge 
of liberal internationalism. It does not mean it totally disappeared, as the war in 
Libya and the Obama Doctrine are evidences of, but the war fatigue, the strategic 
restraint14, Obama’s penchant for more dialogue and less interventionism are rea-
sons to believe on a less interventionist pattern that might or might not be followed 
by his successor. 
However, this more recent period before Barack Obama, along with tensions dur-
ing the Cold War, deeply influenced India’s current perceptions towards the United 
States, both in what concerns its overall behavior and the values it imprinted on the 
liberal international order – in relation to which, India “never fully felt part of” 
(Stuenkel, 2001: 179). As Hurrell (2006) also describes despite years oscillating 
between tensions and some sort of neglect, the U.S. seems to expect at least coop-
eration from India as the regional Asian power. But India’s answer to Washington 
demands has been mixed, to say the least. Many may have benefited with this 
American Wilsonianism and the United States distribution of public international 
goods (including India that received international aid in a few moments of its his-
tory). But that did come with a price. 
India Introverted Democracy
The Bilateral Relations with the United States
The problems started in 1917-1919 when the Indian Liberation Movement realized 
that President Wilson was not referring to their claims of independence when he 
pledged for self-determination (Manela, 2007: xxi). That promise was only directed 
to the Western European states from the dismantled Austro-Hungary Empire. 
Hopes felt again on the ground when President Franklin Delano Roosevelt declared 
more than once his abomination for colonialism, but decided to do nothing about 
13 See for example Keohane (1984) and Gilpin (2001). 
14 In the last State of the Union Address in January 2016, the President acknowledged that the 
world was already multipolar.
Diana Soller
 45 Nação e Defesa
it, as he did not want to be hostile to its major allied – Great Britain (Khilnani, 1999: 
x) – and he believed colonialism was a condemned institution that would fade by 
itself. It was just a matter of time.
During the Cold War, India started to be seen, almost since the beginning, as one of 
the frontline sympathizers of the Soviet Union. Nehru claimed repeatedly that the 
Non-Aligned Movement was a third way for developing countries who did not 
want to take any side on the bipolar conflict. They could “keep away from power 
politics of groups align against one another, which have led in the past to world 
wars and which may lead again to disasters at an even larger scale” (Nehru, 1946 
quoted by Raghavan, 2010: 20). India’s choice and leadership of the Non-Aligned 
Movement as well as its unequivocal preference for a centralized economy 
(Tharoor, 2002: 77) were perceived as moves against the United States, only to be 
confirmed by Indira Gandhi’s signing of a Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet 
Union in 1971 (Mansingh, 2015: 106). 
From an Indian perspective, the United States struggle against Communism deeply 
jeopardized India’s position both internationally and regionally. Washington did 
not support India in the United Nations dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir, and 
made an agreement with Islamabad in 1954 that empowered India’s neighbor and 
enemy (Kapur, 2010: 265). Finally, in 1971, Kissinger and Nixon started the détente 
policy with China, leaving India, then the only democracy in the region, and a non-
aggressive power, isolated (Tharoor, 2012: 9) and in the verge of a war with Paki-
stan over Bangladesh. 
As such, Indian tends to see the agreement with the Soviet Union in 1971 as the only 
possible way out of the third Indo-Pakistani War and only possible line of defense 
from Washington’s quasi-alliance with China (Raghavan, 2014: 237). On top of this, 
the nuclear proliferation problem also caused a number of tensions, especially due to 
the Non-Nuclear Proliferation Act (NNPA), a bill passed during Jimmy Carter’s 
administration (Chaudari, 2014: 220) and the sanctions imposed by the U.S. after the 
first Indian nuclear trials in May 1998. As suggested before, tensions alleviated with 
Bill Clinton’s official visit in 2000, which was meant to create the opportunity for a 
fresh start in the relationship between the “two world largest democracies”. George 
W. Bush followed the lead – due to reasons already explained – but the enthusiasm 
lowered again in the Barack Obama tenure and the UPA2 administration.
This also explains India’s negative reaction when Obama announced the “pivot to 
Asia” policy – that brought back old fears of intromission and imperialism. Even 
today, New Delhi tends to see Washington as “the primary imperial power after the 
Second World War” (Bajpai, 2015: 21) which directly shocks with India’s strong 
notion of “post-colonial sovereignty” (Bajpai, 2015: 24) still very influenced to this 
day by “a deeply rooted aversion to both colonialism and imperialism” (Ganguly, 
2013: 6). Some authors’ say that this resentment is fading away, or at least it should 
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be (Tharoor, 2012: 15) but many still believe that “even 60 years after the end of the 
British colonial rule, post-colonial rationalizations (…) remain alive” (Ganguly, 
2013: 6). This makes India’s cooperation with the United States hegemony difficult 
in many ways.
An Introverted Democracy 
Its own comparison with the United States led New Delhi to look for a place in the 
world where it could still be a democracy (despite its difficult neighborhood and 
estrangement with the United States) without being forced to follow Washington’s 
footsteps, especially in what concerns promotion of democracy. In other words, as 
the model predicts, India resorted to its own collective ideas to come up with its 
renewed worldview. 
This led to an internal debate (still ongoing). However, it is already possible to iden-
tify a raising narrative around concepts from the past that boasts the endorsement 
of many among elites around and public opinion (Soller, 2014: 17).15 First and fore-
most, India believes on its ability to become a great power (Khilnani et al., 2014: 
xxix), with size, structure and political positions to represent many other southern 
countries’ interests through a “mediatory” role, gained by being one of the most 
heterogeneous nations in the world (Bajpai, 2015: 42). Being a non-aggressive 
power, India is willing to be regionally predominant (without creating fear and 
resistance in other states) while using the same concept as a way of legitimizing its 
more global aspirations. Its peacefulness is also a way of reassuring other great 
powers that New Delhi will not generate unnecessary conflict and will try to solve 
any problem that arises through peaceful means. 
Second, there is the tradition that started with Nehru’s of the almost sacred concept 
of “autonomy” in Indian foreign policy (sometimes the terms used are “freedom” 
or “independence”), that dictates that India can never lose its independency of 
decision making (Tharoor, 2012: 9). As recently reinforced by an author “India 
maintains a serious preoccupation with autonomy” (Narlikar, 2013: 598). Together, 
New Delhi’s almost pacifist way of relating with other states (Pardesi, 2007: 211) 
and carefulness of being “not too interventive in the region” (Xavier, 2013: 252), 
does not preclude the existence of an authoritative role. On the contrary: it gives 
India a specificity related to off-shore balancing (in a continent of aggressive states) 
and leadership by example, which creates a relationship with the value of democ-
racy that can be translated by an “isolationist stance [that] is often associated with 
a ‘prudent’ realist India, a democratic city upon the hill that refuses to impose its 
democratic regime as an ‘advantage’ and a ‘model’” (Xavier, 2013: 252). 
15 Besides this relative consensus, it is important to remember that India in a de facto democracy. 
Therefore there is dissent and it is impossible to determine if the dissent is going to grow or not.
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Therefore, it is not fair to say that India does totally disregard democracy as an 
international value. It is just a different sort of democratic foreign policy. As Prime 
Minister Manmohan Singh once wrote “any meaningful solution must be based on 
principles of democratic pluralism and inclusivism, the respect for law and of diversity 
of states” (Singh quoted by Muni, 2009: 16) (emphasis added). Someone familiar 
with India’s history could easily hear the echoes of Nehru’s conception of India as 
a democratic actor: non-entanglement, and the ideas of “freedom” and “self-
respect” (Chauduri, 2014: 68). As such, it is central to acknowledge that when 
Indian leaders refer to a “democratic order” they mean two things: that each state 
is free to have the regime type, religion, or culture of its choosing (as long as they 
do respect other states rights and integrity), and to an international order where all 
great powers are recognized as such, independently from their regime type. Unlike 
the United States, it does not mean that democracy is the only legitimate regime 
type.
Third, India is not demoting itself from its democratic role in the world. But it pre-
fers to lead by example. This is why New Delhi has been developing stronger rela-
tionships with other democracies in Asia (such Australia, Vietnam, Indonesia, and 
Japan) while betting on institutionalizing some democratic values (ASEAN and the 
Bali Initiative are good examples). At a global level India is founding member of 
IBSA (with Brazil and South Africa), a consulting mechanism to curtail problems 
that are common to southern democracies.16 But New Delhi always acts democrati-
cally within the limits of its introversion, imposed, in the past, by the regional and 
the international systems (for most its history India was surrounded by autocracies, 
and until recently it was a relatively weak state) and now self imposed. 
This behavior has disadvantages. On the one hand, a state that puts so many limits 
on the use of force (as a normative imperative) might be seen a “passive” (Khilnani 
et al., 2014: 12); on the other, India’s conception of international democracy, 
expressed in Singh’s words, differs considerably from the U.S. conception, preclud-
ing the possibility of a strong partnership based on values, between the two states. 
However, it also has had, so far, a few advantages: despite Indian de facto very pow-
erful position in South East Asia, other states, even non-democracies, tend to see it 
as trustable state, essential to the traditional multi-vector foreign policy in a trou-
bling neighborhood (Xavier, 2007: 5). It can also help multilaterally: instead of ally-
ing in a group against another, India found a “distinct break from the motivations 
of multilateralism in the twentieth century” (Saran, 2015: 624). In other words, one 
16 So far, we believe it became evident that India perceives itself as a southern democracy, with 
responsibilities of leadership over southern countries. It does not mean automatic confronta-
tion with the West, but the representation of a number of people who had a different history 
from the United States and its allies.
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of the other sides of the coin of autonomy is what an author calls “plurilateral 
engagements [that] essentially serve to position India firmly within the established 
order and in some instances at the global high table of governance” (Saran, 2015: 
624). These are also “groupings that act as bridge between India’s old avatars of 
NAM and G77 and its new role as an emerging power” (Saran, 2015: 624), which 
shows again some attachment with its own roots. 
Therefore, its democratic but non-discriminatory foreign policy gave India the pos-
sibility of being engaged, multilaterally in the world but not entangled to to anyone 
in particular. India is a democratic international actor, but not in sense of de-legiti-
mizing non-democratic states. Not only for the reasons already suggested – its geo-
graphical location in a troubling neighborhood, the advantageous cordial relations 
with non-democratic states, a particular definition of democracy (different from the 
United States), and a scrupulous and introverted use of democracy as an interna-
tional value – but also, and maybe more importantly, the political will of securing 
autonomy, that is still, and it will likely continue to be – a more important internal/
external value than democracy. 
An Unfair International Order
Stephen Cohen makes a persuasive link between the first and third problems, 
related to the perception of the U.S. behavior and the perception of fairness or lack 
of it in what concerns the international order (expressed in our model): “The United 
States and India have clearly grown distinct over the years, not only because of 
the abundant misperceptions on both sides but also because of fundamental 
differences on the best way of peacefully organize the international system, the 
nature of the Soviet Union, the virtue (or sins) of alliances, and above all, the degree 
to each in Indian eyes, the United States resisted India’s emergence as a major 
power” (Cohen, 2001: 287, 288).
A few of the problems are partly solved. In the last State of the Union Address, 
President Obama declared that the world is already multipolar. The Soviet Union is 
no longer the U.S. rival. However, other problems, especially in what concerns jus-
tice in the international order and the virtue of permanent alliances, are not. As 
mentioned before, three values (again, inherited from Nehru) underlie India’s iden-
tity: autonomy, democracy, and pluralism. Those values were learned through the 
experience of colonialism. Independence generated autonomy, and the leaders of 
the newborn country chose democracy (as well as secularism and the rule of law) 
as the basis to create a common framework of equality for the future of the Indian 
people, immersed, since immemorial times, in religious, cultural and linguistic 
diversity (Guha, 2007: 103) – hence pluralism is almost natural in the subcontinent. 
As the model presupposes these internal values have international order equiva-
lents – which India will tend to try to project in the international system, as Kiss-
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inger and other classical and neoclassical realists quoted right at the beginning of 
this article assert. Five values emanate from “autonomy”. One of them is interna-
tional pluralism.17 Democracy is the best regime for India, and the most desirable 
one for every country in the world, but all states are entitled to their own model of 
development and society. Two other values are equality, as every state is entitled to 
the same rights under international law (therefore, there is a rejection of the Amer-
ica idea that democracy is the basis of legitimacy), which is attached to reciprocity. 
States are perceived by India in equality of circumstances; the dichotomy New 
Delhi prefers, to distinguish friends from foes is reciprocity, or, in other words, the 
way a state behave towards New Delhi, independently of regime type, is going to 
define their relationship. 
Thus, the most important international organization is the United Nations, univer-
sal (any state is welcome) but not universalist (in the sense that it does not exclude 
in terms of regime type), as the UN is the guardian sovereignty (the fourth value 
emanating from autonomy), which, for reasons already explained, is seen as a cen-
tral and inalienable right. This also closes the circle of democracy: it is expandable, 
perhaps, but only to the point it does not interfere with sovereignty. And that, from 
an Indian perspective, seems that is not up for negotiation. 
The last value is pluralism. Being India a heterogeneous nation and subscribing 
values of negative freedom (see note 15) India believes that exclusionism is not only 
unfair, but dangerous. It created international institutions that are against Indian 
interests. It prefers an international environmental regime where great powers do 
not jeopardize the development of industrializing countries, and it believes that 
human rights are more secure through sovereignty than through the will of a dis-
cretionary power that due to its position in the international system cannot be truly 
tamed.
As such, the Indian “imaginary” order is multipolar, pluralist, equalitarian (in the 
Vattelian sense), based on reciprocity and sovereignty. Its introversion and taste for 
autonomy will tend to make it try to correct the perceived liabilities of the Ameri-
can order, especially its more extroverted incarnation18.
17 My research makes me believe that this sort of international pluralism has two origins: one was 
already mentioned – the inherent pluralism of the Indian society. The other origin is western 
pluralist liberalism. The Indian Liberation Movement took many its ideas of India from West-
ern Europe where philosophers like Adam Smith, David Hume and Voltaire accepted and 
enhanced the concept that there was no single way of organizing societies, relaying heavily in 
the idea of context. These two origins were harmonized into a single concept of pluralism very 
present in the Indian discourse, policy making, and “imagined” order. 
18 For reasons of space it is not possible to discuss the questions related to other international 
regimes that India dislikes. 
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Final Notes: Bond to Disagree?
Independently on how the debate is going to turn out, if we look at the model 
developed in this article and the description of India’s response to the U.S. chal-
lenges, it is fair to acknowledge that New Delhi is uncomfortable both in its rela-
tionship with its the United States (except for a few positive moments described 
above) and the liberal international order Washington created during and after 
World War II. 
Therefore, it is natural that India will look for its own role in a new world order that 
allows it at least two things: to try to retain, as a long as possible its profile as an 
“introverted democracy” (based on its own self-image) that helps its regional rela-
tionships and its global multi-vector policy; and to keep on making use of its inter-
national influence to stop the United States from being an “extroverted democ-
racy”; that, according to many among Indian elites, jeopardizes Indian interests 
and specially goes against its most cherished values. 
Due to its relative weakness compared to the Washington, New Delhi has actively 
tried to mitigate the U.S. power in three ways: by aligning with other states, namely 
the BRICS, to build alternatives to the liberal international order; by using the 
existing international institutions to contest the United States power (especially 
norms related to human rights, economic ordering, climate change regimes, or even 
to stand by states over which the U.S. has reservations, such as Iran); and by claim-
ing India’s right of a greater intervention in international policy and norms making, 
that could be achieved if the international organizations would accept further 
leadership from the emerging states. The classical example of this position is India’s 
claim of a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council. 
New Delhi’s overall goal seems clear: it does not wish to overthrow the United 
States from the status of a great power in the international system, (the rhetoric of 
the “two largest democracies” serves India well) but it wishes an international 
multipolar order where great power can tame one another: New Delhi sees unipo-
larity as dangerous, as it tends to unleash the hubris of the United States). Further-
more, it is looking for way to influence the values of the international order toward 
a more pluralist and sovereignist framework. 
Putting it simply, the de facto order and India’s “imaginary” order are not com-
pletely divergent. But they are also far from being convergent. 
However, if Robert Gilpin is right, this is only the first phase of an upcoming 
power transition. Therefore, there is much still to decide (including in what con-
cerns India’s internal debates, where a new generation of more pro-American 
scholars is gaining terrain). Furthermore, China’s rise will also create and/or 
deepen a number of questions in New Delhi. As power is relative, weakening the 
United States-led international order empowers China (India’s most dangerous 
rival) as some analysts have been pointing out, and this is the true downside of 
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India’s policy towards the multilateral dimension of world affairs. It seems to 
ignore that China is being rewarded by India’s behavior. This indicates that the 
debate about Indian positions in the world is far from being finished, and that 
shocks, as defined by John Owen quoted earlier in this article, can lead to a rapid 
change of plans. 
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